🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in Process executions

[acebytes]

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Several Process invocations used shell wrappers (e.g., /bin/bash -c "...") with interpolated variables, introducing command injection risks if the dynamic input contained malformed or malicious characters.
🎯 Impact: Prevents unintended execution of arbitrary shell commands within the context of the user running the Cacheout application.
🔧 Fix: Replaced /bin/bash -c executions with direct binary invocations using explicitly defined argument arrays (process.arguments = [tool]). For the Docker prune operation, the shell 2>&1 redirect was securely replicated by assigning the same Pipe() to both standardOutput and standardError.
✅ Verification: Verified code diffs accurately recreate intended commands securely.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 3549176779935705266 started by @acebytes

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