🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in process execution

[acebytes]

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Command injection vulnerabilities existed where hardcoded string commands and string interpolations (\(tool)) were passed to the shell wrapper /bin/bash -c. If any part of these commands were ever influenced by external data, it could lead to arbitrary code execution.
🎯 Impact: Using shell wrappers allows shell metacharacters to be evaluated, increasing the attack surface. Direct process execution eliminates this entire class of vulnerabilities by preventing shell feature expansion.
🔧 Fix: Refactored docker system prune and which executions to use Process with explicitly defined arrays of arguments. Output redirection 2>&1 was replicated securely by assigning the same Pipe() instance to both standardOutput and standardError.
✅ Verification: Review the code changes. Process API is used correctly without bash -c. Note: test suite cannot run due to lack of swift toolchain in the Linux environment.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 8997230368991270982 started by @acebytes

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