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β¦ith direct Process execution Co-authored-by: acebytes <2820910+acebytes@users.noreply.github.com>
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π‘οΈ Sentinel: [security improvement] Prevent command injection by replacing shell wrappers in dockerPrune
π¨ Severity: MEDIUM
π‘ Vulnerability: The
dockerPrunefunction used a hardcoded/bin/bash -cshell wrapper to executedocker system prune -f 2>&1. While the string was static, using shell wrappers for simple executable execution is a security anti-pattern that exposes the application to command injection if arguments are ever dynamically generated.π― Impact: Using direct executable path execution via
/usr/bin/envrather than/bin/bashcompletely mitigates the risk of command injection in the case of future modification.π§ Fix: Removed
/bin/bashfromprocess.executableURL. Instead used/usr/bin/envexecutingdockerwith explicitly defined arguments["system", "prune", "-f"]. The shell redirection2>&1was natively managed using the existingPipe()setup.β Verification: Ensure the app builds and that the "Prune Docker" action still works efficiently and outputs logs correctly.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 6163908683134582679 started by @acebytes